Charles Lemos at MyDD has a post up about Senator Al Franken’s (D-MN) questioning of the Justice Department’s David Kris about the Patriot Act.
Lemos describes the parts of the Patriot Act up for renewal as:
The three powers up for renewal are, first, the Section 215 powers that allow the government to obtain literally any tangible thing held by a third party about you with a secret court order, and that court order does not have to be based on any wrongdoing on your part or any suspicion that you’ve done anything wrong. The other provision, number two, is Section 206 of the Patriot Act, which relates to John Doe roving wiretaps, which allows the FISA court to issue a secret order to follow people’s cell phones, from cell phone to cell phone, if they’re suspected of being involved in terrorism. And the third provision is known as the “lone wolf” provision, which allows a full array of searches to be issued by the court secretly, if someone is believed to be a potential threat.
Franken, playing the “aww shucks, I’m not a lawyer, but . . .” card, wondered how these powers squared with the relatively clear language of the Fourth Amendment:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Franken emphasized the particularity requirement in the Fourth Amendment. Kris was apparently taken aback by the question and was heard to mutter “this is surreal” and then said something about deferring to the courts.
I can’t play the “aww shucks, I’m not a lawyer” card. I know that real life situations have a way of muddying even the clearest language. But, I’m certainly glad for Franken and any other legislators who are committed to reading the Constitution and knowing what it says. There’s a difference between retreating from an absolute stance on Constitutional language because of competing requirements and doubts about intent on the one hand and simply not knowing or caring about the Constitutional language on the other hand.