James Galbraith has a pretty good summary of the roots of the financial crisis at The New Republic. I will summarize the summary. (Eventually, if we abstract this enough, it’ll boil down to “stuff happened, people got screwed.”)
1. The regulatory framework for financial institutions was weakened, allowing the casino to open.
2. The lack of standards led to fraudulent practices in the home mortgage industry – applicant financial information was mostly unverified; appraisals were little more than fabrications; mortgages built to fail were created (e.g. consumers were sold loans with teaser rates that would reset into something unsustainable.)
3. These notes would be bundled together, AIG or some other “insurer” (without anything close to the assets necessary to cover the risk) would essentially guarantee the value of the loans. Ratings agencies would proclaim these notes sound investments with little basis for making such a claim. And with this fairy dust sprinkled over the big shitpile, the notes were sold as AAA investments to pension funds and the like.
One of the consequences of deregulation was that insurers like AIG were allowed to use proprietary risk models as a way of determining the assets necessary to insure these financial products. The risk models did not accurately reflect the actual risk. Using these proprietary models is a little like trying to develop an encryption system with no external tests. You might mean well, and it might even look great to you; but without neutral or even hostile parties whaling away on it, you can’t know how effective it will be in the real world. And the short-term financial incentives were stacked toward encouraging rosy predictions.
Robert Reich suggests that the rising percentage of the country’s wealth appropriated by the very wealthy was the proximate cause of the meltdown:
Consider: in 1928 the richest 1 percent of Americans received 23.9 percent of the nation’s total income. After that, the share going to the richest 1 percent steadily declined. New Deal reforms, followed by World War II, the GI Bill and the Great Society expanded the circle of prosperity. By the late 1970s the top 1 percent raked in only 8 to 9 percent of America’s total annual income. But after that, inequality began to widen again, and income reconcentrated at the top. By 2007 the richest 1 percent were back to where they were in 1928—with 23.5 percent of the total.
Each of America’s two biggest economic crashes occurred in the year immediately following these twin peaks—in 1929 and 2008. This is no mere coincidence. When most of the gains from economic growth go to a small sliver of Americans at the top, the rest don’t have enough purchasing power to buy what the economy is capable of producing. America’s median wage, adjusted for inflation, has barely budged for decades.
(emphasis added). (It’s a little odd to me that, when the owner of capital uses superior bargaining power to extract more work for less pay, that’s just business. When the masses, using the tool of government, uses superior bargaining power to extract more pay for less work, that’s tragically unfair. Seems to me either a basic sense of fairness or a mercenary willingness to use any tool available in negotiation should be applied to both scenarios equally.) Both articles suggest strongly that President Obama has missed a trick here; he had an opportunity to right that which went wrong and, instead, seems inclined to go back to business as usual. Because he didn’t take Big Money to the woodshed, we’re doomed to repetition because the underlying problems have not been addressed.